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Re: IKEv1: use of CERTREQ

juha.ollila@xxxxxxxxx wrote:
>         Hello all,
> The usage of CERTREQs is not very well specified. I know that there
> is a pki-profile draft.
> Two IKE implementations want to negotiate security associations.
> Let's assume the following:
> - There are two security domains
> - Each domain has own CA
> - CAs has cross-certified each other
> - IKE implementations belong different security domains i.e.
> they have not peer's certificate.
> What is the *current practice* in this situation?
> There are at least 4 possibilities, when certificate based
> authentication is used in IKE:
> 1) IKE does not send a CERTREQ at all
> - This contradicts with the pki-profile draft, because in-band
> exchange of certificates is desired.
> 2) IKE sends an empty CERTREQ
> - This contradicts with the pki-profile draft.
> 3) Several CA names are configured and IKE sends multiple CERTREQs
> - This has privacy problem, if security domains don't want to
> reveal their trust relationships.
> 4) CA name is configured for each ISAKMP policy and IKE send one
> - Is this supported in the current implementations?
> BR,
> Juha Ollila

Agreed on 1 & 2.  I don't really understand 3, as the devices
are in different security domains and thus will only be configured
to trust their (presumably one) local CA.  So, #4 sounds right, and
I can even tell you that at least one of Nokia's implementations
works that way.