> We've had this discussion before, and I'd rather not
revisit it.
Right, we've had this discussion before, and it seemed
that the change was always out of scope because
changing the IPsec architecture was not allowed when
we were redesigning IKE. However, now we are changing
the IPsec architecture as well.
We have experience with this
happening today,
because IKE v1 did not do as well as IKE v2 in this
regard.
Correct. IKEv1 did an okay job of negotiating
selectors between routers, but a lousy job of
negotiating selectors between firewalls. IKEv2 is
better, but it is still much more complicated than it
needs to be. And it misses the model for matching
policies. (that policy should be enforced/dictated,
not negotiated)
For
example, in IKE v2 the initiator sends the packet
header info for the
packet that triggers SA creation, to allow the
responder more
flexibility in finding a suitable SPD entry when
peers have
overlapping but not identical SPD entries.
And then what happens when B needs to send a packet
that matches B's selectors from B's policy for A's
original packet, but not A's selectors from A's
policy. And then what happens when it comes time for A
to rekey?