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KINK issue list rev.2



AD Review is merged.
Numbered.
User-to-User issues and cross-realm issues are not yet well ordered.


[**] Indicates an issue considered substantive.
[-] Indicates an editorial issue.
(2401bis): depends on 2401 vs 2401bis


#1 [**] Versioning

	what happens when a receiver receives a major or
	minor version of the kink or qm that is inconsistent with this
	document?  What about unknown payload types?  (Sam Hartman)

	QM version is discussed in section 12 (Forward Compatibility
	Considerations).

	- KINK version
		return error (KINK_INVMAJ, KINK_INVMIN)
	- QM versoin
		already specified in section 12.
	- KINK payload type
		return error (KINK_PROTOERR)
	- ISAKMP payload type
		return error (ISAKMP INVALID-PAYLOAD-TYPE)
		(describe each Notify type usage like ikev2 spec.)

	Specify the behavior when the error is not authenticated
	in the Security Consideration section.


#2 [**] U2U

	I think we need to look at how u2u works at various parts of
	the protocol.  In particular I'm concerned about choosing the right
	u2u principal, dealing with cross-realm u2u and dealing with
	recovering from reboots.  We should confirm all these work out.
	(Sam Hartman)


#3 [**] user-to-user (section 3, 4.2, and 5.1.2)

	It seems like the
	server tells the client what principal to authenticate to, but this
	principal is not properly authorized.  (Sam Hartman)

	More examination of user-to-user case, especially situations where 
	it might *not* be two PKINIT clients, which section 3 says is possible. 
	(BTW, in the Kerberos docs, it's "user-to-user", not "user-user".)
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Verifying remotely supplied identity, as Sam raised earlier.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	In the user-to-user case with TGTs, I think the KINK draft may be 
	over-specifying things that should be dealt with at the Kerberos level. 
	If things are underspecified in Kerberos Clarifications, let's deal 
	with that.  (Ken Raeburn)

	Section 4.2:
	[**] How will the initiator determine whether it will be able to get a
	TGT?  I think policy considerations of when to use u2u and
	authorization considerations of what u2u principals are authorized are
	underspecified in the draft.
	(Sam Hartman)

	[**] Make sure the descriptions of u2u work correctly in the
	cross-realm case.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Section 5.1.2:
	[**] How do I authorize which service I'm talking to in the u2u case.
	I.E. how do I know what principals are authorized for a particular SPD
	entry?  (Sam Hartman)


#4 [**](2401bis) CREATE command from the aspect of 2401bis (section 4.3)

	I need explicit review from the IPsec reviewer of this section to
	make sure it is compatible with 2401bis.


#37 [**] Difference between IKE and KINK on CREATE command (section 4.3)

	IN addition, any differences
	between how this works and how IKE would set up the same SA need to be
	called out.  It is fine for there to be differences, but I want to
	make sure the working group explicitly decided the differences are a
	good thing.

	I'm somewhat concerned that 4.3 is not specific enough to describe
	exactly what key gets set up.  I.E. I'm concerned it may not be
	detailed enough for interoperable implementations.
	(Sam Hartman)


#5 [*] When 3-way, is responder's nonce MUST or SHOULD? (section 4.3 and 7.3)

	Sec 4.3 and 7.3 use SHOULD and MUST respectively regarding when the 
	nonce should be used.  If the circumstances they're describing are 
	different, that's okay, but if so, I missed it on first reading.
	(Ken Raeburn)


#6 [*] Half open (section 4.4)
(solution proposed)

	IPsec does not allow half-open security associations any more as far
	as I can tell in 2401bis.  So it's not just for simplicity, but for
	model conformance.  (Sam Hartman)

	Proposed solution:
	remove the phrase "for simplicity".
	(Message-ID: <tslu0pbc3h9.fsf@xxxxxxxxxx>)


#7 [**] DPD & STATUS (section 4.4.2 and 4.5)

	[**] Discuss status message, rebooting peers and u2u.  This looks a
	lot like the IKE case where you lose all cryptographic context to me.
	(Sam Hartman)


#8 [*] CksumLen (section 5)

	Diagram indicates one octet for cksumlen, but the text (and 
	kcrypto specifications) say it should be two.

	Clarify that you mean the padding discussed in 5.1 (KINK Padding
	Rules), not crypto-system padding.  (Sam Hartman)


#9 [**] etype does not directly indicate checksum type (section 5)
(solution proposed)

	a key's encryption type does not directly indicate 
	a checksum type, it indicates an encryption(-with-integrity-protection) 
	scheme, which does include a required-to-implement checksum type
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Proposed solutions are:
	- Use required-to-implement checksum type determined by the etype.
	- Use get_mic or verify_mic function to generate or verify the checksum.
	- Omit the checksum field before calculation.
	- The Length field is filled with the packet length without checksum and
	  the CksumLen field is zeroed out before the calculation.
	(Message-ID: <20050131093509FD%kamada@xxxxxxxxxx>)


#10 [**] Kerberos allows variable length checksum (section 5)
(solution proposed)

	I'd have to go back and check, but I don't think we require that 
	a given checksum type have a fixed output size, so "leave X amount of 
	space and fill it with zero for computing the checksum" is questionable 
	too.  (Ken Raeburn)

	Proposed solution: look at #9


#11 [*] Kerberos checksum is not deterministic (section 5)
(solution proposed)

	The Kink description of how to verify a checksum assumes that
	Kerberos checksums are deterministic; this is not strictly required.
	(Sam Hartman)

	let kcrypto specify how 
	to verify a checksum, as they're not required to be deterministic, so 
	the "compute it again and compare" approach specified in section 5 is 
	wrong  (Ken Raeburn)

	Proposed solution: look at #9


#12 [**] Subsession keys (section 5 and 8)

	Are subsession keys ignored?  (Ken Raeburn)

	The description of the checksum says that the session key of the
	ticket is used.  That's a way to do it, but the working group should
	explain why it has chosen to ignore the subsession key.
	(Sam Hartman)


#13 [**] Replay protection (section 5)

	The document claims that the transaction id is not used for
	replay detection because Kerberos provides that.  How is that true?
	The authenticator is protected against replays but how is the rest of
	the message bound to that specific authenticator instead of to a
	session key of a ticket?
	(Sam Hartman)


#14 [-] Reserved (15 bits) --  Reserved and must be zero (section 5)

	must be zero on send, must be ignored by receiver.


#15 [**] Principal name of KINK service (section 5.1.2)

	How do I discover the FQDN of my remote peer?   SPD
	entries are configured in terms of  IP addresses.  If you  want to
	store an identity in the PAD, why not store a principal instead of a
	hostname.


#16 [*] EPOCH (section 5.1.2)

	Perhaps you need a description of the time stamp?  I recall there
	being such a description in draft-housley-binarytime-xx.
	(Sam Hartman)

	The text is describing a 4-octet field in the KINK message header
	instead of ASN.1 field, so the description is not so needless.


#17 [**] Checksum when KRB-ERROR occured (section 5.1.4 and 7.1)

	Section 7.1 says the checksum in the KRB-ERROR message is not used,
	but section 5.1.4 says that KINK implementation MUST make use of
	keyed Kerberos errors.  But KRB-ERROR does not have checksum in it (at
	least with RFC 1510 or kerberos-clarifications).
	I think a correct phrase here is "KINK implementations MUST make use of
	a KINK Cksum field when returning KINK_KRB_ERROR and the appropriate
	service key is available."

	Remove following paragraph from section 5.1.4.  (Sam Hartman)
	  KINK implementations MUST make use of keyed Kerberos errors when  the
	  appropriate  service  key  is available as specified in [KRBREVS]. In
	  particular, clock  skew  errors  MUST  be  integrity  protected.  For
	  unauthenticated  Kerberos  errors,  the receiver MAY choose to act on
	  them, but SHOULD take precautions against make-work kinds of attacks.

	Drop reference to krb-error checksum from section 7.1.  (Sam Hartman)
	  defined in the following sections.  The checksum in the KRB-ERROR
	  message is not used, since the KINK header already contains a check-
	  sum field.


#18 [**] Kerberos error type limitations (section 5.1.4)

	Why should a sender send only those errors?  I'm mostly asking
	for an explanation to be given to me or to be added to the document
	rather than liberalization of the requirement.  (Sam Hartman)


#19 [**] Cross-realm and U2U (section 5.1.5)

	Please Consider how this works in the cross-realm case.
	I.E. make sure you end up with the right ticket on the right side.  I
	believe this text assumes that you need a ticket in a realm close to
	the client; I think that for things to work you actually need a realm
	close to the server.  Work through the message flows and make sure the
	KDC doing the decryption actually has the necessary keys and then
	adjust the document if necessary so the right KDC is used.

	The document needs to clearly indicate what error code is used in the
	case when the responder cannot get a ticket because some cross-realm
	key is missing.  In general we want it to be possible for an initiator
	to try several identities until the initiator finds the right one that
	has a shared key.  (Sam Hartman)


#20 [**] KINK_ENCRYPT format (section 5.1.8)

	The format of the encrypted part of KINK_ENCRYPT (section 5.1.8) is
	vague.  I think of using the output of raw encryption algorithms
	(i.e. E(confounder | plaintext | pad)) or using EncryptedData.

	treat "encryption with 
	integrity protection" output as a whole, don't peek under the covers to 
	find a "checksum" part you can throw away  (Ken Raeburn)

	drop references to the initialization vector  (Ken Raeburn)

	Please use the output of the kcrypto encrypt
	operation directly.  Of most importance is to make sure that all
	kcrypto enctypes will work even if it is not possible to decompose the
	kcrypto checksum from the encrypted data.  This probably means that in
	some cases you will have double checksums.
	You also need to deal with making sure you can determine the length of
	the plaintext.  (Sam Hartman)


#21 [*] Next Payload in KINK_ENCRYPT (section 5.1.8)

	Text should probably indacte that next payload must be none.


#22 [*] Kerberos PFS (section 6.8)

	Sec 6.8: "Kerberos in general does not provide FPS so it is somewhat 
	questionable whether a system which is heavily relying on Kerberos 
	benefits from PFS."  First, that sounds like it might be Security 
	Considerations material.  Second, I don't follow; explain please?
	(Ken Raeburn)


#23 [*] KE interoperability (section 6.8)

	What happens if a peer that implements the KE payloads communicates
	with a peer that does not.  Specify the behavior in sufficient detail
	to guarantee interoperability.  (Sam Hartman)


#24 [*] MUST/SHOULD in clock skew (section 7.1)

	The time difference MUST be computed and SHOULD be stored 
	and used?  Why the different requirement levels?  (And is this sort of 
	thing in the domain of KINK or Kerberos?)  (Ken Raeburn)


#25 [**] prf (section 8)

	Section 8 says "prf is the same hash algorithm found in the session
	ticket's etype", but krb-wg-crypto-07 defines hash as unkeyed.
	Fortunately krb-wg-crypto-07 defines a PRF for each etype, so KINK
	should use this PRF.

	Use a prf 
	from kcrypto, don't assume the checksum operations are deterministic 
	hash functions  (Ken Raeburn)

	Section 6.1 (the description of hash algorithm):
	This checksum may not be deterministic and is probably not
	appropriate for use in setting up a key.  A PRF is provided, although
	depending on how the hash is used the PRF may or may not be a suitable
	replacement.  There has been significant discussion within krb-wg on
	when the PRF is appropriate and when it is not.  This discussion
	centered around key determination in pkinit.  (Sam Hartman)


#26 [*] Key derivation (section 8)

	The key derivation seems inconsistent with the crypto framework
	document.  (Sam Hartman)

	I don't understand what this section says well enough to determine
	whether it works with kcrypto.  (Sam Hartman)


#27 [*](2401bis) SPD Considerations (section 10.1)

	This should not go in the security considartions section.  It is
	really more about IPsec architectural considerations than security
	considerations.

	This text needs to take into account 2401bis.  In particular it needs
	to be properly split between SPD considerations and PAD
	considerations.  (Sam Hartman)


#28 [*] Key usage

	Usage of  kink should specify the key usage numbers for kerberos
	encryption.  (Sam Hartman)


#29 [*](2401bis) Rekeying

	section 4.4.1:
	Please make sure this discussion is aligned with 2401bis.  I think it
	may change small details but they seem to have adopted much of the
	same strategy kink uses.  The area wher I believe they speak to this
	issue is when you should rekey (timers etc)


#30 [*](2401bis) IKEv2

	Should we adopt IKEv2?

	If we should...
	- IKEv2 does not have DOI, so how to handle the DOI field in the KINK
	  packet header should be described.
	- Use TS (Traffic Selector) instead of ID (Identification).
	- KEYMAT calculation is changed.
	- How to handle REKEY_SA Notify type.


#31 [*] behavior on KINK_ERROR

	In implementor's point of view, I'd like to see initiator's
	behavior in receiving KINK_ERROR to be defined.
	For example:
	- When KINK_OK is received, initiator MAY act as if the KINK_ERROR
	  payload was not included in the messaged.
	- When KINK_BADQMVERS is received and the Cksum is verified,
	  initiator MAY retry in other Quick Mode version.
	- When one of other error codes is received and the Cksum is verified,
	  initiator SHOULD abort the negotiation.


#32 [-] I-D nits

	Review the I-D nits and RFC authors docs.  I spotted a lot of 
	mechanical things (number of lines per page; avoid hyphenation; use 
	ragged right margin; need two spaces after sentence-ending period; fix 
	page numbers in table of contents; add section numbers to TOC) most of 
	which I think are specified in one of those documents.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	the document needs to meet all the ID nits when it is
	submitted.  (Sam Hartman)


#33 [-] IANA considerations (section 11)

	I think the correct terminology is "port 
	number", not "port", and they're "assigned", not "created".  This 
	section says no new registries are required in the first paragraph, and 
	the third one specifies that IANA must create one (but without the 
	associated procedural data that is required nowadays).  Are the KINK 
	payload types and ISAKMP payload types actually ever used in the same 
	field?  If not, I don't think they need to come out of the same 
	registry.  (Ken Raeburn)

	Needs work.  You may want to stop by tthe IANA office hours and ask
	them for advice.  They are generally quite good at working with
	authors to figure out how things need to be specified.
	(Sam Hartman)


#34 [-] Wording/Terminology

	Section 2 and 10.1.
	Kerberos is now using the term user-user rather than user-to-user.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Section 2.
	Principals are not either client or service principals;
	they can and often do fill both roles.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 2, last paragraph.  "Between" is generally non-directional, 
	but in this case, a direction seems to be intended to be inferred; try 
	"from...to" instead.  (Ken Raeburn)

	Section 3, English usage/grammar problems with the first two paragraphs.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Section 3.
	   which allows a final acknowledgment message when the respondent needs
	   a full three-way handshake. This is only needed when the optimistic
	   keying route is not taken, though it is expected that that will not
	   be the norm. KINK also provides rekeying and dead peer detection as
	What is expected not to be the norm?  Please reword.
	(Sam Hartman)

	Section 4.3, discussing attributes, mixes singular and plural 
	indications.  The word "lone" appears to be popular with the author, 
	too. :-)  (Ken Raeburn)

	Sec 8: "By optional, it is meant..." is badly worded.  (Ken Raeburn)


#35 [-] References

	The reference to [PKCROSS] is unnecessary, and only happens once, in 
	the introduction.  I'd suggest dropping it.  That's one less 
	unpublished I-D in the references section.  (Ken Raeburn)

	[KRBREVS] is referenced but not listed in the references section.
	(Ken Raeburn)

	Sec 5.1.7, next to last paragraph on page 21, is "IKE" (the 
	protocol) fuzzy about use of different SAs, or is it "[IKE]" (the 
	document)?  (Ken Raeburn)

	Section 1:
	Remove the reference to pkcross or cite something outside the IETF.
	It's an expired ID without and active editor.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 1:
	Add an informative reference to IKE.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 2:
	Cite a reference for DER.  (Sam Hartman)

	Section 5: DOI
	Cite a specific registry please.  IANA registries are typically
	named, and a URL reference would probably be appropriate.


#36 [-] Typos

	4.4.2. Dead Peer Detection
	In the fourth paragraph, "loose" is to be "lose".

	5.1 KINK Payloads
	In the first item, the length of the Next Payload should be
	one octet instead of two.

	5.1.1. KINK Padding Rules
	In the second item, "other other" is to be "other".

	5.1.1. KINK Padding Rules
	The first item in the list should end with a period like 
	the others.  (Ken Raeburn)

	5.1.5. KINK_TGT_REQ Payload
	In the third item, "krbtgt/REALM/@REALM" is to be "krbtgt/REALM@REALM".

	5.1.6. KINK_TGT_REP Payload
	In the caption of Figure 13, "KINK_TGT_REQ" is to be "KINK_TGT_REP".

	7.3. CREATE
	"IPspec" is to be "IPsec".

	7.5. STATUS
	In the last paragraph, "REPLY KINK Header" should be in one line.
	In the last paragraph, "[KRB_ERROR]" is to be "[KINK_ERROR]".

	overall:
	"'s" is used in some places where I'd use "s" for a plural form.



-- 
KAMADA Ken'ichi <kamada@xxxxxxxxxx>